> it always seems to me to come down to whether or not human behavior is due to natural mechanisms inside the human central nervous system (even though we may not have a complete understanding of just how those mechanisms work physically) - or, whether there is some supernatural causation for human behavior - something that is beyond our neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters and other physical elements - some extraordinary mental force that can over-ride our physicality.

That is what people initially think of as the debate and so I thought that was the trouble that I was having in my discussion with Tom. I agree with Tom that 'human behaviour is due to natural mechanisms inside the human central nervous system'. I think determinism may well be true, and even if it is false and indeterminism is true (because sub atomic particles seem to behave - perhaps irreducibly - in an indeterministic way) I still think that 'human behaviour is due to natural mechanisms inside the human central nervous system'.

The second part, the 'supernatural causation for human behaviour' is part of the libertarian notion of free will. Both Tom and I seem to agree that libertarianism is false. There is no supernatural causation for human behaviour. Maybe Fred disagrees with us on that.

I think that maybe Tom would be willing to grant that indeterminism might be true - but that the prospects for free will would be the same regardless of whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic?

I think that maybe Fred would be willing to grant that causation is due to physical causes rather than supernatural causes - so long as we can still have free will?

Thats why I'm trying to get clearer on what people are saying... So we can find the genuine points of difference (rather than the verbal ones). That way... We might actually be able to achieve something of a consensus... Or at least... Argue about the real points of difference rather than getting lost in verbal dispute....

Regarding non-physical causation of behaviour... One would need to deny that the physical world is causally closed (which seems to fly in the face of modern science though I suppose it is more of a presupposition than something they argue for).

Regarding supernatural causation of behaviour... The question I have for Fred is if my behaviour is caused by something supernatural instead of something that is due to the facts about the way I am, then how is the 'free act' MY act? How does it help to be at the whim of supernatural forces rather than at the whim of facts about the way I am?