However, unlike MM, Dawkins doesn’t seem to believe that “rationality is not knowing,” that “knowing is an emotional process,” that “rationality is worthless in terms of behavior choice,” and/or that “only when rational conclusions become beliefs”—beliefs being, by MM’s reckoning, “the source of the most powerful emotions that guide our "cognitive" behavior”—“can rationality, imperfect as it is, influence behavior choice.”

And although Dawkins and MM both seem to be moral relativists, Dawkins doesn’t seem to believe, as does MM, that all “people believe [only] what feels good to them - and use their brains to justify it”—he certainly wouldn’t believe that about himself or other atheists that happened to see things his way; although, as MM indicates, Dawkins apparently does believe that it’s the non-atheists, those that don’t see things as Dawkins himself sees things, that “have the desire to believe what feels good,” and “the ability to compartmentalize their brain - to allow them to hold onto beliefs that feel good.”

And finally, since Dawkins himself is something of a true believer, albeit in the circular notion of “natural selection,” which Provine now acknowledges is not even a mechanism or an active cause of evolution, it seems that it’s Dawkins himself who compartmentalizes so as to hold onto his various beliefs, that apparently make him feel good. Is that irony?

But alas, MM will probably assert that even this is yet more evidence of her own circular notion, her so-called “hypothesis,” that all “people believe [only] what feels good to them - and use their brains to justify it,” since it shows how even the great Dawkins is like everyone else in that he too believes only “what feels good to him” (i.e. natural selection), and “uses his brains to justify it.”